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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-SELF-INCRIMINATIONHARMLESS ERROR-Application of the
Harmless Error Doctrine to Violations
of Miranda: The California Experience
Because it is impossible to make all criminal trials totally free
from error, all jurisdictions accept the doctrine of harmless error as
it applies to ordinary evidentiary mistakes committed at trial. All
fifty states and the federal courts have harmless error statutes or rules.
Although they vary somewhat, the general theme of these statutes
and rules is that a defendant's conviction will be reversed only if
he was prejudiced by the mistake.1 The saving of judicial resources
is considered an advantage that outweighs the burden put on the
defendant of arguing that he would not have been convicted in the
absence of error. 2 Difficulties arise, however, when the error committed at trial involves a violation of the defendant's constitutional
rights. While the policy of judicial economy still applies, the danger
of undermining the effectiveness of a constitutional guarantee, by
treating its violation as harmless error, must be considered. As will
be discussed, the Supreme Court has fashioned special rules to
handle this issue of harmless constitutional error.3
Using decisions of the appeliate courts of California that have
applied the federal harmless error rule to violations of Miranda v.
Arizona4 and Escobedo v. lllinois,ri this Note will examine the logic
and effects of the California application. 6 However, the California
I. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967). CALIF. CoNST. art. VI, § 4½ reads:
No judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in any case, on the ground
of misdirection of the jury, or of the improper admission or rejection of evidence,
or for any error as to any matter of pleading, or for any error as to any matter
of procedure, unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the
evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has
resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1964) states: "On the hearing of any appeal or writ of certiorari in
any case, the Court shall give judgment after an examination of the record without
regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties."
For a short history of the harmless error rule as it applies to constitutional and nonconstitutional errors, see Note, Harmless Constitutional Error, 20 STAN. L. REv. 83
(1967). See also J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 21 (lid ed. 1940).
2. See f!:enerally Mause, Harmless Constitutional Error: The Implication of Chapman v. California, 53 MINN. L. REv. 519 (1969).
3. See notes 8·26 infra and accompanying text.
4. 884 U.S. 436 (1966).
5. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
6. Many of the cases examined in this Note are post-Escobedo but pre-Miranda.
However, since the limited Escobedo warnings of the right to counsel and right to
remain silent as interpreted in People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal.
Rptr. 169 (1965), were subsequently incorporated into Miranda, the Escobedo and
Miranda case~ can be legitimately treated as a single entity. In all these cases, the issue
under consideration is the same-how did the California courts apply the harmless
error rule to confessions that were invalid because of some defect in the constitutionally
required warnings?
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experience can only be understood by first briefly describing the
United States Supreme Court's decisions regarding harmless constitutional error and then showing the approaches taken by other
states in their application of the harmless error rule to Miranda
violations.7 Not only will this analysis put the California experience
in its proper perspective, but it will also show the feasibility and
difficulties of implementing any harmless error rule.
I.

BRIEF HISTORY OF HARMLESS CONSTITUTIONAL ERROR

Until the 1967 decision of Chapman v. California, 8 the Supreme
Court, with one exception,9 had consistently held that a violation of
a constitutional right of a defendant in a criminal trial resulted in
automatic reversal of his conviction and the ordering of a new trial.10
In Chapman, the Court applied the federal harmless error rule to
uphold the conviction of the defendants despite adverse comment
to the jury by the prosecutor concerning the defendant's failure to
testify. The Court had earlier held that such adverse comment violated a defendant's right not to be compelled to be a witness against
himself, as guaranteed by the fifth amendment.11 In cases after Chapman, the Court extended the applicability of its harmless error rule
7. See, e.g., Soolook v. State, 447 P.2d 55 (Alaska 1968); Duckett v. State, 3 Md. App.
563, 240 A.2d 332 (Ct. Spec. App. 1968); People v. Post, 23 N.Y.2d 157, 242 N.E.2d 830,
295 N.Y.S.2d 665 (1968); Commonwealth v. Padgett, 428 Pa. 229, 237 A.2d 209 (1968).
8. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
9. Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900), in which the Court held that evidence
received in violation of the defendant's sixth amendment right to be confronted by
witnesses against him was harmless because of the defendant's own confession of guilt.
10. In Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897), the Court rejected the argument
that a coerced statement by the defendant was not prejudicial in language broad
enough to require automatic reversal for all improperly introduced evidence. Subse•
quent to Bram, and until 1967, the Court reversed convictions involving constitutional
error without even discussing harmless error. Among the grounds for reversal were
denying the right to trial before an impartial judge, Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510
(1927); basing a conviction on an unconstitutional statute, Stromberg v. California, 283
U.S. 359 (1931); instructing the jury using an unconstitutional presumption, Bollenbach
v. United States, 326 U.S. 607 (1946); denying counsel at trial or at some other critical
stage, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52
(1961), Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948), House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42 (1945), _
Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 (1945); admitting into evidence a coerced confession,
Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963), Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963),
Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961), Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958), Watts
v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949), Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945); holding a trial
in a community where there had been an excess of prejudicial pretrial publicity,
Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); denying a speedy trial, Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967); discriminating in the selection of grand and petit juries, White
v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967); failing to provide an impartial jury, Parker v. Gladden,
385 U.S. 363 (1966); trying a defendant who was incompetent to stand trial, Pate v.
Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966). In Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65 (1946),
the Court implied that when "the departure is from a constitutional norm or a specific
command of Congress," harmless error rules might be inapplicable.
11. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
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to certain violations of the sixth amendment's right to counsel12 and
confrontation.13
The Court in Chapman first held that the issue whether a conviction could stand when a constitutional right had been violated is
a federal question to be decided under a federal harmless error rule.14
The Court attempted to give content to this rule by distinguishing
between "constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error"15 and "constitutional
errors which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant
and insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless ...•" 16 The Court exemplified what it
meant by basic constitutional rights by citing cases dealing with
confessions, the right to counsel, and the right to have an impartial
judge.17 In devising a standard to deal with those errors that in a
particular case are sufficiently insignificant to be considered harmless,
the Court referred to the test it had applied in the earlier case of
Fahy v. Connecticut 18 in requiring "the beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error
complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained."19
The Chapman test, directly descended from Fahy, came under
heavy criticism by commentators as being ambiguous and unworkable,
and thereby giving little effective guidance to lower federal and state
courts.20 With these difficulties clearly in mind,21 the Supreme Court
12. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218
(1967).
13. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969). See also the concurring opinion of
Justices Blackmun and Burger in Evans v. Dutton, 400 U.S. 74, 90-93 (1970).
14. Justice Harlan dissented, maintaining that the federal courts should be concerned only with whether the state harmless error rule comports with the due process
requirements. 386 U.S. at 51. See also Mause, supra note 2, at 527-37; The Supreme
Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARv. L. REv. 69, 208-09 (1967); Note, Constitutional LawJudicial Power-Harmless Error, 19 CAsE W. R.Es. L. REv. 157, 160-67 (1967); Note,
Harmless Constitutional Error, 20 STAN. L. REv. 83 (1967); Recent Case, 20 VAND. L.
REv. 1157 (1967).
15. 386 U.S. at 23.
16. 386 U.S. at 22.
17. 386 U.S. at 23. It is difficult to understand why, as in Chapman, freedom from
intentional adverse comments by the prosecutor, when the defendant is legitimately
exercising his right against self-incrimination, is not basic to a fair trial and therefore
subject to the automatic reversal rule. See Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in
which he advocated a rule of automatic reversal for Griffen violations. He stated:
The adoption of any harmless error rule ••• commits this Court to a case-by-case
examination to determine the extent to which we think unconstitutional comment
on a defendant's failure to testify influenced the outcome of a particular trial.
This burdensome obligation is one that we here are hardly qualified to discharge.
386 U.S. at 45.
18. 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963).
19. 386 U.S. at 24.
20. Not only is the Court's failure to specify those additional constitutional rights
that are immune from the harmless error rule confusing, the standard itself is dif-
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in Harrington v. California,22 despite its insistence to the contrary,
committed itself to the traditional overwhelming-evidence test. 23 In
Harrington, a codefendant's inculpatory confession was introduced
into evidence against the petitioner in violation of his sixth amendment right to confrontation, as interpreted in Bruton v. United
States. 24 The Court concluded that the case against the petitioner
was "so overwhelming that unless we say that no violation of Bruton
can constitute harmless error, we must leave the state conviction
undisturbed." 25 Thus, the focus of inquiry under this test is on the
amount of untainted evidence rather than on the effect that the
tainted evidence had on the particular fact finder's decision.26
II.

HARMLESS ERROR AND MIRANDA-THE VARIOUS .APPROACHES

In Miranda, the Supreme Court determined that in order to
neutralize the inherently coercive atmosphere of custodial interrogaficult to implement. See, e.g., People v. Ross, 67 Cal. 2d 64, 429 P.2d 606, 60 Cal,
Rptr. 254 (1967), which also dealt with a Griffin violation. While referring to the
Chapman test, the majority in Ross relied on the overwhelming-evidence test and ruled
that the error was harmless, essentially balancing the magnitude of the error against
the extent of the untainted evidence. In his dissent, Chief Justice Traynor argued that
the references to Fahy in Chapman "can be explained only on the theory that a substantial error that might have contributed to the result cannot be deemed harmless
regardless of how clearly it appears that the jury would have reached the same result
by an error-free route ••••" 67 Cal. 2d at 85, 429 P .2d at 621, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 269.
To the Chief Justice, applying Chapman is a two-step process. First, the state must show
beyond a reasonable doubt that the result would not have been different absent the
error. If this is demonstrated, then the state must prove that the error did not play a
substantial part in the jury's verdict, the guide being the magnitude of the error, not
the amount of untainted evidence. See also L. HALL, Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE&: J. lsRAEL,
MoDERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 628 (3d ed. 1969); Thompson, Search and Seizure and The
Myth of Harmless Error, 42 NOTRE DAME LAw., 457, 467 (1967); Note, Harmless Constitutional Error, 83 HARv. L. REv. 819 (1970).
21. See the oral arguments of Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969), in 5
CRIM. L. REP. 4033 (1969).
22. 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
23. 395 U.S. at 254. An earlier indication of this commitment can be seen in
Fontaine v. California, 390 U.S. 593, 596 (1968).
24. 391 U.S. 123 (1968). The Court held in Bruton that the introduction of a
codefendant's confession at a joint trial violated the defendant's sixth amendment
right to cross-examination.
25. 395 U.S. at 254. But see Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in which he
accused the majority of overruling Chapman. As he stated,
Chapman, then, meant no compromise with the proposition that a conviction
cannot constitutionally be based to any extent on constitutional error. The Court
today by shifting the mquiry from whether the constitutional error contributed to
the conviction to whether the untainted evidence provided "overwhelming" support
for the conviction puts aside the firm resolve of Chapman and makes that
com promise.
395 U.S. at 255.
26. That the verbal formulation of the harmless error rule is not finally settled is
indicated by Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S.
74, 90 (1970), in which he used the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of harmlessness, citing to both Chapman and Harrington. 400 U.S. at 93.
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tions, certain warnings must be given to preserve the accused's fifth
amendment privilege against self incrimination.27 The Court explicitly stated that a primary purpose for requiring the warnings was
to deter police from using "third-degree" techniques, whether of a
physical or psychological variety.28 However, even in those cases in
which such specific coercion was absent, the Court found that custodial interrogation without prior warnings would be per se coercive.29 One desired effect of this determination was to relieve the
courts of the time-consuming process of deciding whether the statement was involuntary under traditional due process criteria.80 Basically, if the warnings are not given, any statement resulting from
custodial interrogation is necessarily involuntary.
The Supreme Court has not yet considered whether Miranda violations are subject to the harmless error rule--although it does not
seem that the Court can avoid deciding that issue indefinitely. Thus,
while the state courts must follow the federal harmless error
standard, in the absence of definitive Supreme Court opinions they
are free to expand the areas in which the standard applies.81 Accordingly, some states do regard violations of Miranda as harmless error.32
The common approach in most state courts is to divide constitutionally invalid confessions between (1) coerced or involuntary confessions-those in violation of the due process clause and which
subject a conviction to automatic reversal-and (2) "voluntary" confessions-those inadmissable solely because the Miranda warnings
have not been given and which therefore make a conviction amenable to an application of the harmless error rule. The inconsistency
of this approach with the premises underlying Miranda is readily
apparent: if statements obtained during custodial interrogations
without the required Miranda warnings are inherently coerced, they
cannot be termed "voluntary."33
That the voluntary-involuntary distinction is tenuous is exemplified by the reasoning of the Pennsylvania supreme court in Commonwealth v. Padgett,84 the case in which that court first applied the
harmless error doctrine to a Miranda violation. In focusing on the
27. !184 U.S. at 466. See also L. HALL, Y. K.uosAlt, W. LAFAVE 8: J. IsRAEL, supra note
20, at 626.
28. !!84 U.S. at 446-55.
29. !!84 U.S. at 455-56.
ll0. 384 U.S. at 457.
!!l. For example, in addition to applying the harmless error rule to Miranda violations, the California courts have applied it to violations of Mapp v. Ohio, !!67 U.S. 64!!
(1961). See People v. Parham, 60 Cal. 2d 378, !184 P.2d 1001, 3!! Cal. Rptr. 497 (1963),
cut. denied, !177 U.S. 945 (1964).
!12. See cases cited in note 7 supra.
!Ill. See text accompanying notes 27-29 supra.
M. 428 Pa. 229, 2!17 A.2d 209 (1968).
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effect that a constitutional rule has on the reliability of the guiltdetermining process, the court said, "When contrasted with the
inherent unreliability of a conviction procured . . . on the basis of
a coerced confession, a conviction obtained through use of an Escobedo or Miranda violation does not go to the very roots of fact-finding reliability, for such a statement may well be voluntary."35 This
analysis not only avoids the "inherently coercive" language of
Miranda, but also fails to take into account the pre-Miranda cases in
which confessions obtained by objectionable police methods were
excluded without regard to their trustworthiness. For example, in
finding the defendant's confession involuntary under traditional due
process grounds, the Supreme Court in Spano v. New York 36 stated:
The abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions does
not turn alone on their inherent untrustworthiness. It also turns on
the deep-rooted feeling that the police must obey the law while enforcing the law; that in the end life and liberty can be as much endangered from illegal methods used to convict those thought to be
criminals as from the actual criminals themselves.37

In deciding whether to apply the harmless error rule, the court
in Padgett placed great reliance on whether the Supreme Court had
applied the constitutional right retroactively. The court argued that
a retroactive application of a particular constitutional right was
indicative of the Supreme Court's evaluation of the effect of that
right on the reliability of the fact-finding process.38 The Padgett
court reasoned that, since the Supreme Court had not applied
Miranda retroactively,39 the harmless error rule was appropriate.
That this logic cannot withstand close scrutiny is indicated by
Harrington, in which the Supreme Court held as harmless error a
violation of the defendant's right to confrontation as interpreted in
Bruton40-a decision to which the Court had given retroactive
effect.41 Thus it seems clear that harmless error and lack of retroactivity do not always coincide.
Finally, the Pennsylvania procedure of distinguishing between
voluntary and involuntary confessions may not accomplish a savings of
judicial resources, which is the primary justification of the harmless
error rule. This is so because the Pennsylvania courts must determine
both whether the statement introduced at trial is inadmissable solely
on Miranda grounds, and if so, whether it is still "involuntary"
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

428
360
360
428

Pa. at 235-36, 237 A.2d at 212.
U.S. 315 (1959).
U.S. at 320·21.
Pa. at 236, 237 A.2d at 212.
See Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
See notes 22-25 supra and accompanying text.
See Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968).
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under the multi-factor due process analysis that Miranda supposedly
replaced.{2 Thus, in Pennsylvania, the analysis does not stop once a
Miranda violation is found, but must continue in order to discover
whether the traditional due process standard has been violated. If
the court then deems the statement involuntary on the basis of the
second step of this analysis, it must order a new trial. If the Pennsylvania courts are to be consistent with the last of the pre-Escobedo
involuntary-confession cases,43 which emphasized deterring the police
from using illegal or coercive means of interrogation,44 reversals will
be frequent, with the result that judicial resources will be further
expended. In contrast, should the courts interpret Miranda violations to demand automatic reversal, there would be no need for the
due process analysis; and the trial courts, prosecutors, and police
would know with certainty that when a statement is obtained and
used in violation of Miranda, the defendant's conviction will be
subject to automatic reversal. Not only would this interpretation
deter the police from violating Miranda, but it would also force the
trial courts and prosecutors to analyze rigorously any doubtful
confession. Thus, the protections of Miranda would be assured, and
the possibility of error would be diminished.
In an effort to avoid the difficulties of the voluntary-involuntary
distinction, as exemplified by the approach taken in Pennsylvania,
the California appellate courts have devised an alternative approach.
Despite Miranda, which expressly rejected the distinction between
an admission and a confession,45 the California courts have continued
to recognize this distinction in applying the harmless error rule to
Escobedo-Miranda violations. Although the Escobedo-Miranda warnings must be given before either admissions or confessions may be
admitted at trial, the California courts have held that any defect in
administering these warnings demands automatic reversal if the
statement erroneously introduced in evidence was a confession,46
42. As the California supreme court stated in People v. Fioritto, 68 Cal. 2d 714, 717,
441 P.2d 625,626, 68 Cal. Rptr. 817, 818 (1968):
A principle objective of that decision [Miranda] was to establish safeguards that
would liberate courts insofar as possible from the difficult and troublesome necessity
of adjudicating in each case whether coercive influences, psychological or physical,
bad been employed to secure admissions or confessions.
See also L. HALL, Y. K.AMlsAR, W. LAFAVE & J. !sRAEL, supra note 20, at 639; Mause,
supra note 2, at 519.
43. See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
44. 373 U.S. at 519; see also text at note 37 supra.
45. 384 U.S. at 476-77.
46. There is one exception to California's rule of automatic reversal of confessions
obtained without proper Escobedo-Miranda warnings. This is the multiple-confessions
situation, i.e., where the same defendant has confessed to the same crime a number of
times. Before this exception can be applied, it must appear that (1) the inadmissible
confession did not contain details significantly different from the other confessions; (2}
the prosecution placed no undue emphasis on the erroneously admitted confession; and
(8) the confessions improperly obtained did not induce those legally obtained-which
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but that if the statement was an admission, the harmless error rule
applies. 47 In order to be considered a confession, a statement must
include every essential element of the alleged crime.48 An admission,
however, "is but an acknowledgement of some fact or circumstance
which in itself is insufficient to authorize a conviction and which
only tends toward the ultimate proof of guilt."49 The rationale for
this distinction is that a confession, but not an admission, constitutes
such persuasive evidence of guilt that it "operates as a kind of
evidentiary bombshell which shatters the defense,"110 thereby making
automatic reversal appropriate. 51
The results of this distinction are illustrated by the case of In re
Shipp. 112 Petitioner had been convicted of a felony-murder charge
arising out of a robbery, and the principal evidence against him was
a tape-recorded statement, obtained without the proper Escobedo
warnings, in which he admitted both the robbery and a connected
assault which left the victim injured but alive. While the court in
Shipp classified the statement as a confession to the crime of robbery,
that court, as well as California courts in subsequent cases,113 interpreted it as only an admission to the charge of murder, thereby making the statement susceptible to the harmless error rule.
While California's approach is unique, it deserves careful consideration for several reasons. First, it illustrates the general difficulties
requires in effect that the legal confession must be the first obtained. The basis for this
exception is that the presence of these three factors assures that there was a reasonable
probability that the improperly obtained confession did not contribute to the verdict
and that therefore the harmless error rule is appropriate. See People v. Valencia, 267
Cal. App. 2d 620, 73 Cal. Rptr. 303 (1968); People v. Jacobson, 63 Cal. 2d 319, 405
P.2d 555, 46 Cal. Rptr. 515 (1965). See also Recent Development, 65 MICH, L. REv. 563
(1967). See also notes 90-91 infra and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 71 Cal. 2d 614, 456 P.2d 633, 79 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1969);
People v. Schader, 62 Cal. 2d 716, 401 P.2d 665, 44 Cal. Rptr. 193 (1965).
48. See In re Cline, 255 Cal. App. 2d 115, 122, 63 Cal. Rptr. 233, 238 (1967).
49. In re Cline, 255 Cal. App. 2d I 15, 122, 63 Cal. Rptr. 233, 238 (1967).
50. People v. Schader, 62 Cal. 2d 716, 730-31, 401 P.2d 665, 673-74, 44 Cal. Rptr. 193,
202 (1965).
51. See People v. Valencia, 267 Cal. App. 2d 620, 627, 73 Cal. Rptr. 303, 307-08 (1968).
52. 66 Cal. 2d 721, 427 P.2d 761, 59 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1967).
53. See, e.g., People v. Powell, 67 Cal. 2d 32, 429 P.2d 137, 59 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1967);
In re Cline, 255 Cal. App. 2d I 15, 63 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1967). The California supreme
court has occasionally acknowleged the difficulties in implementing this distinction. In
two cases, People v. Doherty, 67 Cal. 2d 9, 429 P.2d 177, 59 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1967), and
People v. Powell, 67 Cal. 2d 32, 429 P.2d 137, 59 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1967), the court simply
applied the harmless error rule to the introduction of statements obtained without the
Escobedo warnings, without determining whether the statement was an admission or a
confession. By avoiding the distinction, the court was in effect following the practice of
those states that apply the harmless error rule to all Escobedo-Miranda violations. In
the two cases referred to-Doherty and Powell-the court found prejudice, and therefore the failure to make the distinction did not adversely affect the defendant. Even
if the statements were in fact confessions, thus making the convictions subject to automatic reversal, the result in both instances would have been the same-the ordering of
a new trial.
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that any court must face in deciding whether the harmless error rule
applies to Miranda violations. Like Pennsylvania, California applies
the Harrington overwhelming-evidence test to statements obtained
in disregard of Miranda, the only difference being California's distinction between admissions and confessions. 54 Once a statement is
considered an admission, the analytical process in both states is the
same. Second, because California's courts hold that a confession
received in violation of Miranda requires that a conviction be automatically reversed, California offers more protection to the Miranda
guarantees than those states that employ the voluntary-involuntary
distinction. Thus, if the potentially moderate California practice
severely restricts the effectiveness of Miranda, a greater restriction
on its effectiveness can be anticipated from those states that apply the
harmless error rule to all "voluntary" statements obtained in violation of Miranda. Third, the primary concern of the California courts,
even before Harrington and despite th'eir constant references to
'the Chapman test, has been with the amount of untainted evidence
presented at trial. 55 As such, the California experience can be viewed
54. In the area of admissions, it would seem that the California courts should also
have to make the voluntary-involuntary distinction. In order to avoid making this
distinction, they would have to apply the harmless error rule to all coerced (in the
sense of violations of the due process clause) admissions. Such an application would be
contrary to the Supreme Court's decision in Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949), in
which the Court held that if the means of acquiring evidence violates due process
guarantees, then automatic reversal is appropriate. The Court stated:
In holding that the Due Process Clause bars police procedure which violates the
basic notions of our accusatorial mode of prosecuting crime and vitiates a conviction based on the fruits of such procedure, we apply the Due Process Clause
to its historic function of assuring appropriate procedure before liberty is curtailed or life is taken.
llll8 U.S. at 55.
With the one exception of People v. Gardner, 266 Cal. App. 2d 19, 71 Cal. Rptr. 568
(1968), the California appellate courts, when confroPted with an admission obtained
in violation of Escobedo or Miranda, have avoided the difficulty by simply stating the
general rule that admissions are subject to the harmless error rule and not recognizing
any voluntary-involuntary distinction.
55. See, e.g., People v. Milton, 270 Cal. App. 2d 438, 75 Cal. Rptr. 803 (1969), in
which the court ruled that the admission obtained after the petitioner had invoked
his right to silence violated Miranda. But the court did not consider this harmless
error because the inconsistencies between these admissions and the defendant's subsequent testimony at the trial, which was also excluded, were integral parts of the
prosecution's case and all other evidence was purely circumstantial. See also In re
Shipp, 66 Cal. 2d 721, 726, 427 P.2d 761, 764, 59 Cal. Rptr. 97, 100 (1967), in which
the California supreme court found that the failure to advise petitioner of his right to
counsel or his right to remain silent was prejudicial because "[e]xcept for the tape
recording (where defendant described in detail how he had robbed and 'restrained'
the victim], the prosecution did not introduce evidence of a persuasive nature that
connected Shipp with the crime." People v. Webster, 254 Cal. App. 2d 743, 62 Cal.
Rptr. 476, (1967), in which the court, after ruling that the defendant's admission was
made without the Escobedo warnings, stated:
In view of the circumstantial nature of the other rvidence against the defendant,
the evidence of his statement in which he said that he had choked Mrs. Harley
[the charge was murder and therefore the statement was classified as an admission]
was bound to be very damaging to the defendant in the event that the jurors
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as an indication of the direction in which the state courts will go on
the issue of harmless error now that the overwhelming-evidence test
is the law. Finally, not only does California have sufficient case law
in point, but the high regard accorded its courts gives their decisions
strong precedential value. Thus, the Supreme Court will no doubt
consider the California approach seriously when it finally decides
whether, and in what way, to apply the harmless error rule to
Miranda.

III.

THE LESSONS FROM CALIFORNIA

A common practice of the California appellate courts is to use
the harmless error doctrine as a means of avoiding the more difficult
determination of whether a constitutional error has been committed.
For example, in People 11. Cox, 56 rather than determining the sufficiency of the Miranda warning, a California court of appeals declared
that, even assuming that the police officer's warnings were inadequate, the introduction at trial of the defendant's admission was not
prejudicial. 57 Similarly, in People 11. Williams, 58 the California supreme court declared that even if the "arguably technically insufficient" warning did not satisfy the Escobedo requirements, the effect
of the defendant's statements at most was to impeach his credibility
believed the testimony of Officer Welch. There is no reason to assume that the
jurors found that testimony to be incredible.
254 Cal. App. 2d at 752, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 481.
The problem with this type of analysis is that the court seems to be implying that
if there had been stronger untainted evidence against the accused, the error would
have been harmless. See People v. Talley, 65 Cal. 2d 830, 423 P .2d 564, 56 Cal. Rptr. 492
(1967), and In re Cline, 255 Cal. App. 2d 115, 63 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1967). It should also
be noted that the California courts employed a variety of additional methods of
circumventing Chapman when that decision was the law. For example, the Chapman
test was expressly misquoted in a line of cases. See, e.g., People v. Coffey, 67 Cal. 2d
204, 430 P.2d 15, 60 Cal. Rptr. 457 (1967). See also People v. Haston, 69 Cal. 2d 233,
444 P.2d 91, 70 Cal. Rptr. 419 (1968), in which the California supreme court, after
deciding that the petitioner's confessions to crimes with which he was not charged
were obtained without the proper Escobedo warnings, declared that their introduction
into evidence for the purposes of establishing a modus operandi was harml= error.
The court stated what it considered the Chapman test to be:
That standard "requires reversal if, upon an examination of the entire record,
it appears reasonably possible that the error might have materially influenced the
jury in arriving at its verdict, and the error must be considered harmless if the
likelihood of material influence is not within the realm of reasonable possibility."
69 Cal. 2d at 252-53, 441 P .2d at 104, 70 Cal. R:ptr. at 432 (emphasis added), quoting
People v. Coffey, 67 Cal. 2d 204, 219-20, 430 P.2d 15, 25, 60 Cal. Rptr. 457, 465 (1967).
56. 269 Cal. App. 2d 579, 75 Cal. Rptr. 147 (1969).
57. See also People v. Blackburn, 261 Cal. App. 2d 554, 67 Cal. Rptr. 918 (1968);
People v. Ashford, 265 Cal. App. 2d 673, 71 Cal. Rptr. 619 (1968); People v. Ireland,
270 Cal. App. 2d 522, 70 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1968); People v. Oster, 260 Cal. App. 2d 539,
67 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1968); People v. Hays, 250 Cal. App. 2d 373, 58 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1967).
58. 71 Cal. 2d 614, 456 P.2d 633, 79 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1969).
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at trial, and their introduction into evidence was harmless, due to
other overwhelming evidence of guilt.119
This avoidance of the constitutional issue is contrary to the
underlying assumption of Chapman and Harrington that in order to
apply the harmless error rule, a court must first discover an error.60
The rule was not intended by the Court to serve as a method of
avoiding necessary decisions on constitutional issues. As a practical
matter, the substantive content of the Miranda protections will never
be adequately developed if the courts are allowed to refrain from
deciding the tough, but necessary, constitutional issues.61
Even more important is the way in which the California courts
have used the overwhelming-evidence test to negate the policies and
protections of Miranda. The opinion in In re Cline 62 illustrates
this point. In Cline the wounded defendant, who had lost much
blood and was in a state of shock, was interrogated in a hospital without any prior warnings. Under these circumstances, the defendant
admitted that he had shot at police deputies. The court interpreted
this acknowledgment as an admission because it did not indicate that
the defendant was aware that his targets were police-an essential
element of the alleged crime.63 The court then decided that since the
admission "had heavily incriminatory quality," 64 it might have
motivated the defendant to testify at trial, where he was impeached
by four prior felony convictions. The court concluded, therefore,
that the introduction both of the admission and of the prior convictions must be considered errors. However, the court considered them
harmless errors due to "the massive, immovable, independent evidence of guilt," 65 consisting entirely of the eyewitness accounts of
two police officers, one of whom was wounded at the time of the
alleged crime. The court stated:
Relative to the massive weight of independent proof, Cline's extrajudicial incrimination was not an evidentiary bombshell but only a
popgun. Neither his inadmissible statement nor an adverse jury reaction to his courtroom testimony could damage a case lost beyond

repair.oo
Even if one accepts the court's questionable assertion that the
59. 71 Cal. 2d at 622, 456 P.2d at 637, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 69.
60. 886 U.S. at 20-21.
61. For a discussion of the many aspects of Miranda that are still undefined, see
L. HALL, Y. KAMlsAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 20, at 533-52.
62. 255 Cal. App. 2d ll5, 63 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1967).
63. The defendant was charged with assault with a deadly weapon on a police
officer, under CAL. PENAL CODE § 245(b) (West 1968).
64. 255 Cal. App. 2d at 124, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 240.
65. 255 Cal. App. 2d at 124, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 240.
66. 255 Cal. App. 2d at 125, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 240.
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untainted evidence was overwhelming, the fact remains that in
spite of all this legitimate evidence, the police interrogated a
wounded man who was not only weak from loss of blood, but also
was still in a state of shock. In describing the need for the Miranda
warnings, the Supreme Court in that case pointed to interrogations
which "trade[s] on the weakness of individuals."67 Surely Cline's
interrogation should be included within that category. Indeed, the
police conduct involved there might have been so offensive as to
violate even the traditional due process involuntary test. 68 Yet, the
court, by mechanically employing the harmless error rule, never
reached the question whether the admission violated the due process
requirements. Nor did the court consider the possible unreliability
of statements elicited from the defendant while he was wounded and
in shock. Thus, under the guise of avoiding reversal on account of
inconsequential error, the court not only sterilized the Miranda decision, but also nullified any due process protection outside Miranda.
Even if intentional bad faith by the police is partially discounted, 69
police practices such as in Cline-which are no more than a careless
and senseless disregard of the law-are strong-evidence that a rule of
automatic reversal is needed in order to deter official misfeasance. 70 It
is submitted that to dismiss this type of flagrant disregard of Miranda
as harmless error would amount indirectly to overruling that decision
and depriving an accused of his legitimate rights.
The fact that Cline is not an isolated case is demonstrated by
People v. Tally, 71 in which two brothers were charged with burglary
and both made extrajudicial statements without having been given
any warnings by the police. In deciding that one defendant's admission, in which he declared among other things that "his brother was
a better burglar," was harmless, the court said:
Although his inconsistent statements regarding the stolen articles
found in his home might be viewed as showing a consciousness of
guilt ... and other of his statements might be viewed as having a
67. 384 U.S. at 455-57.
68. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963).

w.

69. See L. HALL, Y. KAMISAR,
LAFAVE & J. IsRAEL, supra note 20, at 444-46, for
a statement of the position that much of the official misbehavior is indeed intentional.

See also Project, Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J.
1519 (1967).
70. See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 518-20 (1963); Kamisar, Betts v. Brady,
Twenty Years Later: The Right to Counsel and Due Process Values, 61 MICH. L. R.Ev.
219, 239-40 (1962). Justice Harlan advocated automatic reversal on this type of official
misbehavior "because society cannot tolerate giving effect to a judgment tainted with
such intentional misconduct." Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 52 n.7 (1967) Oustice
Harlan, dissenting).
71. 65 Cal. 2d 830, 423 P .2d 564, 56 Cal. Rptr. 492 (1967).
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slight tendency to incriminate him, the statements added little to the
prosecution's strong case against him. 72

Thus in spite of the complete disregard by the police of their duty
to give the Escobedo warnings, the court concerned itself only with
the "slight" incriminatory tendency of the defendant's statements.
The Tally case, like Cline, illustrates the extent to which the California courts will go to uphold a conviction by use of the inherently
subjective overwhelming-evidence rule. A determination whether a
defendant is entitled to the constitutional protections of Miranda
that is based on whether the judge characterizes the inadmissible
statement as "a popgun" or considers it as adding "little to the prosecution's case" seriously undermines the defendant's constitutional
rights under the fifth amendment.
A final indication of the extent to which some California courts
will go to avoid a finding of prejudice in situations in which the dictates of Miranda have not been followed is their practice of finding
harmless error because a defendant's invalid admissions were consistent with his subsequent defense. In People v. Hooper,73 the court
ruled that the introduction of the defendant's admissions-which
had been obtained without the Escobedo warnings-was harmless
error because those admissions were no more than a repetition of the
defendant's alibi to which he and his witnesses had testified at the
trial. At no point in its opinion did the court consider the influence
of the invalid admission on the defendant's decision to use the alibi
defense or on his decision to take the stand.
In People v. Alesi,74 the California supreme court at least acknowleged that it would be illogical to rule that the introduction
into evidence of the invalid admission was harmless error because it
was consistent with the accused's defense-that he did not make the
illegal sale-when that defense was in fact influenced by the invalid
admission. 7li The court decided, however, that even if the defense
presented at trial was influenced by the illegally obtained admission,
it was the only meaningful defense available and, therefore, the error
was harmless. 76 The practical effect of this analysis, therefore, is that
after finding that the defense was influenced by the admission, the
court is required to engage in the questionable and time-consuming
process of identifying and evaluating all the possible defenses in each
particular case in order to be sure that the one actually presented by
the defendant was the only meaningful one available. Furthermore,
72,
73.
74.
75.
76.

65 Cal. 2d at 840, 423 P.2d at 571-72, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 499-500 (emphasis added).
250 Cal. App. 2d ll8, 58 Cal. Rptr. 100 (1967).
67 Cal. 2d 856, 434 P.2d 360, 64 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1967).
67 Cal. 2d at 862, 434 P.2d at 364, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 108.
67 Cal. 2d at 862, 434 P.2d at 364, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 108.

954

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 69

this procedure will offer little protection to defendants if the court,
in determining whether a defense was meaningful, insists that the
defense and admission be consistent with each other. In People v.
Shepard, 77 for example, the defendant's three conflicting admissions,
all obtained without the Escobedo warnings, were introduced at
trial to demonstrate the defendant's consciousness of guilt and his
ownership of the gun that, after two previous denials, he finally
admitted owning in the third admission. In determining that the
error in receiving the admissions in evidence was harmless, the court
first reasoned that if the jury had believed the defendant's alibi
witness, it would not have had to concern itself with the conflicting
admissions. Apparently, the court did not consider that the witness'
credibility may have been affected by the conflicting admissions.
Second, the court found that defendant's admission that he owned
the gun was consistent with his subsequent defense. The court stated:
Nor was the story told at the trial induced by the original denial of
ownership; the final version was impelled by the testimony that defendant owned the gun-a fact which the police would and could
have developed even if defendant had exercised his right to remain
silent.78
Thus, the court not only admitted that the defendant's admissions
"impelled" his defense, but also assumed and stated that the admission was true, even though it was never proven at trial.
IV.

OBSERVATIONS

While the California approach demands automatic reversal when
confessions obtained in violation of Miranda are introduced at trial,
and therefore represents a more moderate approach than that taken in
those states that apply the harmless error rule to all Miranda violations, its distinction between admissions and confessions in applying
the harmless error rule is illusory and untenable. 79 As the Supreme
Court said in Miranda, "The privilege against self-incrimination
protects the individual from being compelled to incriminate himself
in any manner; it does not distinguish degree of incrimination." 80
77. 250 Cal. App. 2d 736, 58 Cal. Rptr. 814 (1967).
78. 250 Cal. App. 2d at 738, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 816.
79. See R. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 59-64 (1970), in which Justice
Traynor, retired Chief Justice of the California supreme court, states that although he
formerly supported the confession-admission distinction, he now views it with some
reservation "in the light of additional reflection on the many post-Miranda problems
that confront state courts." He argues, however, that an "appropriate"-albeit limited
-harmless error test should be applied to both confessions and admissions. His method
of determining the harmlessness of an error that involves the admission into evidence
of statements obtained in violation of Miranda is to examine the nature and numb~r
of issues that the statements resolve against the defendant. Id. at 59.
80. 384 U.S. at 476.
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Certainly a defendant's admission that he robbed and assaulted a
victim81 or that he shot at police82 has as much influence on the trier
of fact as does an actual confession of murder or intentional assault
of a police officer. Also, there is no reason to doubt that coerced
admissions are as unreliable as coerced confessions.83 Yet, in California,
the introduction of the latter into evidence will result in automatic
reversal, whereas the introduction of the former will be susceptible
to the harmless error rule.84
More important than the above considerations, however, the
California experience illustrates the extent to which the harmless
error rule can nullify the force of Miranda in protecting a defendant's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The
most flagrant abuses of Miranda, when embodied in admissions, will
be tolerated so long as the amount of untainted evidence justifies the
conviction. The problem remains, of course, to determine exactly
what untainted evidence is and how much of this evidence is necessary to justify a conviction. Instead of subjecting a defendant's constitutional rights to analysis under this quantitative standard, it
would seem more appropriate to insist on strict adherence to the dictates of Miranda and to require automatic reversal if an inadmissible
statement is introduced at trial. In this manner, the police will be
deterred from violating the Miranda requirements, and the prosecutors and trial courts, working under the stricture of automatic
reversal, will be eager to guard against the introduction of any
inadmissible statement. As a result, the frequency of error will be
diminished and a savings of judicial resources can be effected. This
argument is reinforced by the fact that the Miranda warnings can be
given with a minimum of difficulty,86 and while the exact dimensions
of that decision are as yet unclear,86 there would seem to be little
administrative cost in possible over-protection. Thus, the Miranda
warnings should be given whenever there is any possibility that the
interview could be termed "custodial interrogation." Moreover, the
police should insist upon an explicit waiver, and all interrogation
should cease once an accused expresses that desire. Adherence to
this strict procedure will result in the admissibility of any significant
statement, and the procedure itself is consistent with our tradition as
an accusatorial, not inquisitorial, system.8'1
Bl. See text accompanying notes 52-58 supra.
82. See text accompanying notes 62-66 supra.
83, See note 54 supra.
84. Id.
85. 884 U.S. at 488-86. But see Justice White's dissenting opinion in
U.S. at 584-86.

86. See Orozco v. Texas, 894 U.S. 824 (1969).
87. 884 U.S. at 460.
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It has been argued that automatic reversal is especially appropriate when illegally obtained confessions are introduced because of the
certainty that the confession will so permeate the proceeding that any
effective defense is impossible.88 Thus, to fashion a harmless error
rule based entirely on those few cases in which prejudice will not be
found would result in a greater expenditure of judicial resources
because of the necessity of proving prejudice in the vast majority of
cases in which it would otherwise be legitimately presumed.89
It is possible that a rule of automatic reversal would have to
make an exception for those cases involving either multiple confessions-in which the defendant's first confession was obtained in
complete compliance with constitutional requirements while subsequent confessions were not, and yet all were admitted into evidence
--or multiple admissions-in which the defendant made precisely
the same admission more than once, but only the first admission was
elicited constitutionally. Such an exception would be necessary because it is not yet clear that repeated Miranda warnings are necessary
each time a statement is elicited.90 Therefore, there may be no error
at all if the proper warnings were given to the defendant initially.
Moreover, the degree of prejudice resulting from the introduction of
the second statement would necessarily be slight since the fact-finders
would have the same information before them in the error-free introduction of the first statement.91 Thus, the existence of such a narrow
exception to a rule of automatic reversal would probably not result
in an undermining of the Miranda protections, as is the case under
the harmless error rule.
V.

CONCLUSION

The lessons learned under California's experience with the
harmless error rule reinforce the conclusion that a rule of automatic
reversal is needed to ensure that the requirements of Miranda are
fully complied with. The lack of effective control by the Supreme
Court over the state courts' application of the inherently subjective
88. Mause, supra note 2, at 543.
89. Id.
90. See Maguire v. United States, 396 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1968); Miller v. United
States, 396 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1968); Tucker v. United States, 375 F.2d 363 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 888 (1967); People v. Hill, 39 Ill. 2d 125, 233 N.E.2d 367 (1968);
State v. Magee, 52 N.J. 352, 245 A.2d 339 (1968). See also note 46 supra.
91. Similarly, it is arguable that the actual prejudice to the defendant at trial may
not be great in the situation where the first statement is elicited in violation of
Miranda but subsequent statements are obtained in compliance with the requirements
of that case. However, because the initial statement has such 3: high likelihood of
pressuring the accused to give the subsequent statements-thereby prejudicing him by
drawing forth an otherwise constitutionally valid and admissible statement-all the
statements should be excluded to encourage the police to comply with the dictates of
Miranda.
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overwhelming-evidence standard must be recognized. The Court
would, of necessity, have to engage in extensive review of trial court
proceedings in order to control even the most flagrant misapplications of that standard, and it seems unlikely that the Court has either
the time or the inclination to oversee the trial courts in such a
manner. This lack of effective control by the Court is especially
dangerous in cases involving Miranda violations because of the low
regard in which the Miranda safeguards are held generally,92 and
specifically in the state courts. 93 Thus, a rule of automatic reversal
seems to be both the appropriate and necessary solution if the protections and general viability of Miranda are to be retained.

92. See title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C.
§ 8501 (Supp. V, 1965-1969), which, in effect, overrules the Miranda decision.

98. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 104 Ariz. 174, 450 P.2d 364 (1969). Indeed, the
Supreme Court itself may be cutting back on its enthusiastic endorsement of the
principles of Miranda. See Harris v. New York, 39 U.S.L.W. 4281 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1971).

